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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of having a divided government (as opposed to a 
unified government) on stock market volatility in France. The role the French 
government plays throughout the different industries operating on its land is 
undoubtedly significant as it is through the government that laws and regulations 
are shaped and implemented. The main theory this paper aims to test empirically 
relates to the relationship between repartitions of governmental powers and 
policy risk. According to some literature, a divided government, due to what is 
referred to as a gridlock effect is less likely to implement policy changes and 
therefore policy risk is lower. As policy risk is lower, stock market volatility and 
returns are expected to be lower as well. The intuition behind this theory will be 
tested by firstly identifying the French government’s status (divided vs. unified) 
throughout the period spanning from 1967 till 2015, and then paralleling those 
results with the volatility of stock market returns the various periods considered. 
I find positive and significant results indicating a higher volatility in times of 
divided government thus refuting the gridlock theory. These findings are in line 
with the standard balancing model (Fiorina, 1992) and Mayhew’s Divided We 
Govern hypothesis. Results remain robust after being subjected to tests for 
omitted variable bias, autocorrelation, multicollinearty and omission of abnormal 
observations.  
Key Words: Policy Risk, Stock Market Returns, Government, Gridlock 
JEL-Codes: P16 
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DIVIDED THEY RISE: STUDYING THE EFFECT OF POLICY RISK 
ON STOCK MARKET RETURN 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The role a government plays throughout the different industries operating 
in a certain country is undoubtedly significant as it is through the government 
that laws and regulations are shaped and implemented. These same laws and 
regulations ultimately end up shaping pivotal components of the environment 
businesses operate on. The ease at which proposed laws are actually translated to 
effective, and implemented, laws is vital to company risk assessments. This 
brings about an important notion that is often brought up in institutional 
economics, finance and political economy and it is the notion of Policy Risk (also 
referred to sometimes as Political risk). Policy risk involves the risk that an 
investment's returns could be negatively affected as a result of changes in policies 
in a given country. The pertinence of this topic is mainly twofold: First, this 
topic fills a gap in the literature. Given the research I have conducted, and to the 
best of my knowledge, there are no other studies looking at the effect of policy 
risk on stock market volatility and returns aside from a study conducted in 
Germany (Bechtel & Fuss, 2008). Secondly, with increasing discussions about the 
role a government should play in shaping the economy, the relationship between 
stock market return and probability of policy change has become an important 
academic predicament.  In fact, the effect of politics and more specifically policy 
risk on stock markets is a topic that is highly discussed in literature today.  The 
aim of this study is therefore to address two key questions: Is the probability of 
nationwide policy change (indicator of policy risk) different under a unified 
Thesis  Toni Joe Lebbos 
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government as opposed to a divided government? If so, how does this affect 
financial markets, and more specifically, stock market volatility? I use data on 
stock market returns and political indicators in France from 1967 till 2015 and 
estimate the impact of having a divided government using a standard OLS 
regression model. Results show a positive and significant between divided states 
of the government and higher volatility thus refuting the gridlock theory. Such 
results further support Fiorina’s standard balancing model (Fiorina, 1992) and 
Mayhew’s (1991) Divided We Govern hypothesis.  
Besides this introductory section, this paper is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review where Relevant Definitions are discussed 
and the main theories in the literature are elaborated on and discussed. Chapter 
3 introduces the data used in this study and specifies its sources. In chapter 4 an 
overview of the empirical estimation process is presented and the models used for 
the estimation process are elaborated on. Chapter 5 contains results of the 
estimation process and chapter 6 discusses various robustness checks conducted 
to validate findings. Finally chapter 7 elaborates on the findings and their 
significance before concluding in chapter 8.    
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will start by discussing some key definitions that are 
vital to well understanding the topic at hand. Then, the main theories and 
models in the literature related to the research question are elaborated on and 
the contributions they bring to the study are examined. 
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2.1 DEFINITIONS  
 It is fundamental to well define certain term, concepts and notation that 
will be used throughout this study. Doing so not only contributes to a better 
understanding of the key models and theories but also adds credibility to the 
study in that the terms defined usually are backed up by extensive literature. 
 To start with, it is vital to define terms related to the political system in 
France and it’s power repartition. France is a republic, i.e. the institutions 
governing France are described by the Constitution, and to be more specific by 
the current constitution under the Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic was 
established in 1958, and was largely attributed to the work of General de Gaulle, 
and his prime minister at that time Michel Debré. The constitution has been 
amended seventeen times since then. Even though the French constitution is 
considered parliamentary, one distinction it has is that it allocated relatively 
extensive powers to the executive (President and Ministers) when compared to 
other western democracies. The executive powers lie mostly within the President 
(elected by universal suffrage)’s will. The legislative branch on the other hand 
involves mainly the French parliament that is made up of two houses or 
chambers. The lower and principal house of parliament is the Assemblée 
nationale, or national assembly; the second chamber is the Sénat or Senate. New 
bills (projets de loi), proposed by government, and new private members bills 
(propositions de loi) must be approved by both chambers, before becoming law 
(Francais, Gouvernement.fr, 2015). The figure below provides a clear overview of 
the different mechanisms governing institutions in the French political system:  
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Note: Dotted arrows designate indirect influence whereas the solid ones refer to direct influence through appointment, 
voting, regulation, lawsuits and censure) (Wikipedia, 2016) 
Another aspect that singularizes the French Fifth Republic from other 
Western Political system such as that of the US is the presence of a dual 
executive. Through a constitutional arrangement known as semi-presidential 
(premier-presidential), the president and a prime minister hold equivalent 
rightfulness and legitimacy in their corresponding domains. The president 
typically acts as a mediator for establishments of the republic and often is in 
FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE UNDER THE 5TH REPUBLIC 
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charge of decisions related to foreign affairs. The prime minister on the other 
hand leads the government and guides the lawmaking process (Baumgartner, 
Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014). 
It is also quite relevant to touch upon the definition of a divided 
government and that of a unified one.  According to Menefee (1991) a divided 
government is defined as one where a partisan conflict exists between the 
executive and the legislative branches.  Tautologically, a unified government is a 
government where there is no partisan conflict between the executive and the 
legislative branches. In France, whether a government is divided or not goes 
beyond a simple binomial system. This is mainly because France has found itself 
throughout the years in times where the President and the Prime Minister are 
partisan rivals. This type of divided government is referred to as cohabitation 
where the executive branch of the government is divided. This, for instance 
cannot occur in the United States where the executive cannot be divided. The 
only certain alignment of position is that of the National Assembly and the 
Prime Minister who always belong to the same partisan camp (Baumgartner et 
al, 2014). In short, both the legislative and the executive segments of the French 
government might be in a unified or divided state leading to four possible 
situations (Siaroff, 2003): 
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FIGURE 2: POLITICAL SCENARIOS IN FRANCE 
 
Policy risk (also sometimes referred to as political risk) is defined in 
various interrelated manners in the literature.  For the purpose of this research, 
the definition adopted will be that of Carlson (1969), Greene (1974), Aliber 
(1975), Baglini (1976) and Lloyd (1976) who, either explicitly or implicitly, define 
political policy risk to be the risk that the returns on an investment incur losses 
due to shift in political policies shaping business environment (Kobrin, 1982). 
This includes instabilities in investment returns sourcing from changes in 
government structure.  
TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS 
Term Definition Source 
Divided 
Government  
Government where a partisan conflict exists 
between the executive and the legislative branches 
Menefee (1991) 
Unified 
Government  
Government where there is no partisan conflict 
between the executive and the legislative branches 
Menefee (1991) 
Policy Risk Risk that the returns on an investment incur losses 
due to shift in political policies shaping business 
environment. This includes instabilities in 
investment returns sourcing from changes in 
government structure 
Carlson (1969), Greene 
(1974), Aliber (1975), 
Baglini (1976) and Lloyd 
(1976) 
Devided 
Legislature/
Divided 
Executive  
Uniﬁed 
Legislature/
Divided 
Executive   
Devided 
Legislature/
Uniﬁed 
Executive 
Uniﬁed 
Legislature/
Uniﬁed 
Executive   
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Fifth 
Republic 
The fifth republic was established in 1958, and was 
largely the work of General de Gaulle, and Michel 
Debré his prime minister. It has been amended 17 
times.  
French Government 
Website 
Assemblée 
Nationale 
The lower and principal house of parliament French Government 
Website 
Sénat The Senate  French Government 
Website 
 
2.2 RELEVANT STUDIES 
The main purpose behind this paper progresses around verifying or 
negating empirically the notion that with a divided government, policy changes 
are less likely to be implemented because of a certain “gridlock” effect. The 
gridlock effect, in theory, is supposed to assuage risk by increasing the 
predictability of future economic policies under the claim that it is hard for 
government to implement law under divided governments. A lower level of policy 
risk is therefore expected under divided governments.  In the context of this 
study, stock market return volatility will serve as an indicator or measure of risk; 
i.e. volatility of returns should be lower under divided governments. This theory 
is firstly backed up by Fowler (2006) who argues that a divided government 
assuages policy risk by reducing uncertainties related to large policy changes 
because a divided government obliges the opposing parties to confer and limits 
the range of policy changes that would be possible under a unified government 
(Fowler, 2006). Bechtel and Fuss (2008) also back up this theory empirically in 
that they argue as well that a divided government in Germany entails less policy 
risk: “financial markets can operate under lower policy risk in times of divided 
than in periods of unified governments” (Bechtel & Fuss, 2008, p. 1). Likewise, a 
more recent paper by Kim, Pantzalis and Park (2012) published in the Journal of 
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Financial Economics also argues for this rational stating that “uncertainty 
regarding the impact of future policies on forms rises with the difficulty in 
assessing the set of preferred policies” (Kim et al, 2012, p. 2).  
 Also, since most of the policy risk surges from law production and 
implementation, looking at literature related to that is quite important and 
useful. Baumgartner et al. (2014) look at differences in law production in France 
under diverse government power repartitions (divided vs. unified). They do not 
find any significant difference in changes of overall legislative productivity. 
Conley (2007), who runs a study on France, finds on the other hand that major 
shifts in the political landscape have happened in periods of divided government. 
He clearly states:  
“The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was established to avoid legislative 
paralysis, and the French presidents’ misgivings about the majority’s policies 
notwithstanding, considerable policy shifts—from the social realm to 
denationalizations—have been the result of divided government in the last two 
decades. Parliament’s responsibility for such policy changes is clear” (Conley, 
2007, p. 258) 
Mayhew, in Divided We Govern, disputes the formerly “conventional” 
notion that under divided governments in the US (when Congress and the 
presidency are controlled by different parties) less important legislation is passed 
than under unified government (Mayhew, 1991). 
	
TABLE 2 MAIN THEORIES SUMMARY 
Authors Publication Insight 
Fowler (2006) Elections and Markets: The Divided government assuages policy risk by 
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Effect of Partisanship, Policy 
Risk, and Electoral Margins 
on the Economy 
reducing uncertainties related to large policy 
changes because a divided government obliges 
the opposing parties to confer and limits the 
range of policy changes that would be possible 
under a unified government 
Bechtel and 
Fuss (2008) 
When Investors Enjoy Less 
Policy Risk: Divided 
Government, Economic 
Policy Change, and Stock 
Market Volatility, 1970-2005 
“Financial markets can operate under lower 
policy risk in times of divided than in periods of 
unified governments” (Bechtel & Fuss, 2008) 
Kim, Pantzalis 
and Park 
(2012) 
Political Geography and 
Stock Returns: The Value 
and Risk Implications of 
Proximity to Political Power 
“Uncertainty regarding the impact of future 
policies on forms rises with the difficulty in 
assessing the set of preferred policies” (Kim, 
Pantzalis, & Park, 2012). 
 
Baumgartner et 
al. (2014) 
Divided Government, 
Legislative Productivity, and 
Policy Change in the USA 
and France 
No significant difference in changes of overall 
legislative productivity under Divided vs. 
Unified Government 
Conley (2007) Presidential Republics and 
Divided Government: Law-
Making and Executive 
Politics in the United States 
and France 
Major shifts in the French political landscape 
have happened under divided governments.  
Mayhew (1991) Divide We Govern There should be no difference in legislative 
productivity under divided vs. unified 
government 
 
Moreover, some other relevant studies provide important insight as well. 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for instance look into the impact of divided 
government on key economic parameters such as growth and inflation. They find 
that variations in economic growth are correlated with election results and, 
conversely, electoral results tend to depend on the state of the economy. Karol 
(2000) finds that conflict of the executive and the legislative branches influences 
trade. Poterba (1994) finds that budget deficit reduction in the U.S. states is 
lower under divided than under unified government and Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) conclude that unified governments “respond more (and more quickly) to 
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income shocks” (Roubini & J, 1989, p. 823). Milner and Rosendorff (1997) 
conjecture that international trade agreements are less likely to be ratified under 
divided government. The evidence suggests that the level of non-tariff barriers 
significantly increases if there is partisan conflict between Congress and the 
President (Lohmann & O’Halloran, 1994). Howell et al. (2000) estimates that 
“periods of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation by 
about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the basis of 
contemporaneous perceptions of important legislation. Lastly, Fowler (2006) finds 
that inflation risk is significantly lower in the U.S. if the party of the president 
does not control the majority in Congress. 
TABLE 3 OTHER RELEVANT STUDIES SUMMARY 
Authors Insight 
Kim, Pantzalis and 
Park, 2008 
Impact of political proximity (geographical proximity as well as political 
connections of companies to the government) on stock market returns 
Alenisa & Rosenthal, 
1995 
Impact of divided government on key economic parameters such as 
growth and inflation 
Karol, 2000 Conflict of the executive and the legislative branches influences trade 
Poterba, 1994 Budget deficit reduction in the U.S. states is lower under divided than 
under unified government 
Roubini & J, 1989 Unified governments “respond more (and more quickly) to income shocks 
Milner & Rosendorff, 
1996 
International trade agreements are less likely to be ratified under divided 
government 
Lohmann & 
O’Halloran, 1994 
Level of non-tariff barriers significantly increases if there is partisan 
conflict between Congress and the President 
Howell, Adler, 
Cameron, & 
Riemann, 2000 
Periods of divided government depress the production of landmark 
legislation by about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the 
basis of contemporaneous perceptions of important legislation 
Fowler, 2006 Inflation risk is significantly lower in the U.S. if the party of the president 
does not control the majority in Congress 
 
Finally, when it comes to literature that has contributed to the 
methodological aspect of this paper, it is vital to mention three core models. The 
Thesis  Toni Joe Lebbos 
 
 
 
 
16 
first is a paper by Kim, Pantzalis and Park (2012) where the authors discuss the 
impact of political proximity (geographical proximity as well as political 
connections of companies to the government) on stock market returns (Kim et al, 
2012).  The second paper is by a paper authored by Bechtel and Fuss entitled. In 
this study, the authors focus more on defining policy risk, and studying its 
impact on stock market returns given different government compositions (Bechtel 
& Fuss, 2008). And finally, a paper by Baumgartner et al (2014) assesses the 
variations in law production under different states of the government by 
regressing that latter variable onto dummy variables depicting the status of the 
French government.  Table 4 below summarizes the main studies considered 
when developing the empirical estimation of this paper: 
TABLE 4 CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDIES REVIEWED 
Authors Country  Data collection  Analysis  
Kim, Pantzalis, & 
Park (2012) 
 
United States Taylor’s Encyclopedia of Government 
Officials: Federal and State” and “State 
Elective Officials and the Legislatures 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential 
Elections 
OLS 
Regression 
Füss and Bechtel 
(2008) 
Germany  German stock market and German political 
system (Kedar 2006; Kern and Hainmueller 
2006; Lohmann et al. 1997) 
OLS 
Regression  
Baumgartner et 
al. (2014) 
France and 
United States 
France’s public government data and 
Lazardeux’s (2009).  
OLS 
Regression 
 
3 DATA 
The study will cover a period of around 48 years, from 1967 to 2015. This 
is a relatively long period when compared to the time period considered by other 
similar studies such as Füss & Bechtel (2008) who cover a period of 35 years.  
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DATA ON STOCK MARKET PRICES AND VOLATILITY  
 Data on stock market returns was retrieved from DataStream 
(Datastream, 2016). The current main indicator for the overall performance of 
the French stock market is the CAC 40. This indicator however was initialized 
only in 1987. For the period before that (1967-1987) I gather data on the French 
financial market indicator, which was the main indicator for the performance of 
the French stock market during this period. Since what is of interest in this study 
is stock market volatility, the fact that two indicators are used should 
theoretically not have a significant effect on results. Either way, I account for 
differences these two indicators might have in the way they are computed by 
creating the dummy pre-1987 which equals 1 for all year prior to 1987 and 0 for 
all years after 1987.  
 I define stock market volatility as the 20-day standard deviation of 
returns. This is a common way to measure volatility in the finance literature. I 
calculate it by firstly converting close prices of the indexes into a return series 
using the following formula:  𝑟! = ln𝑃! − ln𝑃!!! 
 From this return series I then compute the 20-day standard deviation of 
returns and annualize the values obtained by multiplying them by the square 
root of the number of trading days in a year ( 252). Finally, I take the average 
volatility for every year in order to have comparable values relative to other 
variables in the model.  
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 The following box plot and histogram provides a good description of the 
distribution of volatility values:  
FIGURE 3: BOX PLOT VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 4: HISTOGRAM VOLATILITY 
 
Our volatility variable has a mean of 0.17, a standard deviation of .06298, a 
minimum value of .0310792, and a maximum value of .3523437. The maximum 
value here corresponds to the year 2008 characterized by abnormal stock market 
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volatility due to the global financial crash. The table below presents detailed 
descriptive statistics related to the main variable including kurtosis and 
skeweness: 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS VOLATILITY 
 
Further more, by looking at a scatter plot of volatility through time, one 
can point out that period of high stock market volatility seem to coincide with 
years in which France underwent significant change in its political landscape or 
years where the world witnessed financial crashes. For instance the two principal 
outliers around the years 2000s correspond to year 2002 and 2008 where stock 
markets crashed globally. Such outliers will be further discussed in the chapter 
tackling robustness checks. Another distinguishable movement to the naked eye 
is an upward trend in stock market volatility throughout the time period 
considered. The slope of the fitted line is around 0.00232.  
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FIGURE 5: SCATTER PLOT 
 
INFLATION AND GDP PER CAPITA  
 Data on inflation and GDP per Capita was retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2016).  I control for both of these 
variables, as it is standard in political economy and financial economics literature 
and intuitively relevant since inflation and GDPpc portray accurately economic 
conditions and have an influence on stock market volatility. Controlling for these 
two variables is backed up by Bechtel & Fuss (2008) who also follow the same 
rational when studying the impact of government control patterns on the 
German Stock Market.  
HISTORICAL DATA ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT  
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 Regarding data related to the status of the French government 
(divided/unified) throughout the years considered; this study uses a database 
developed by Baumgartner et al (2015). The data includes information on 
whether the executive and legislative branches of the French government are 
divided or unified from 1967 till 2015. It also includes other important variable 
discussed below:  
A) ELECTION YEARS  
In France, legislative elections disrupt the standard development of 
legislative activities and therefore it is expected that elections years have a 
significant effect on stock market volatility. I create a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for year in which there are legislative elections and 0 otherwise 
(Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014). Pantzalis et al. 
(2000) also emphasis on the importance of accounting for pre-election periods as 
they are commonly accompanied with additional policy uncertainty. 
 
B) COHESIVENESS AND DISTANCE 
 According to Tsebelis (1995) and Krehbiel (1998), variations in the 
ideological position of key veto players in the French government contributes 
immensely to the extent to which policy changes are actually implemented.  To 
account for such a factor, it is important to study two aspects at hand: Distance 
and Cohesiveness.  
Distance refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the 
opposition during divided government. Distance dissects further the concept of 
divided and unified governments by assessing the magnitude of certain 
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government control circumstances (Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, 
Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014). It is measured by looking at the Party Manifesto of 
the political groups involved and assessing the ideological distance separating the 
majority and opposition groups. The difference is then weighted by the number 
of seats held by both groups. I retrieve data on distance from Baumgartner et al 
(2014) who used Lazardeux’s (2009) data for their analysis.  
Cohesiveness measures the ideological distance within the majority. In 
other words, cohesiveness evaluates the intra-majority ideological distance. It is 
the standard deviation from the weighted mean of the ideological position of 
governing party or parties (Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & 
Moody, 2014). The weighted mean is calculated in the following manner:  
 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = (𝐼!"×𝑀!")!!!! 𝑀!"!!!!  
Where:  
§ Ipi is the ideological position of partyi   
§ Mpi is the number of seats held by partyi.  
 
Since cohesiveness denotes the deviation from this mean, it is calculated as 
follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  1𝑀!"!!!! (𝐼!" −𝑊𝑀)!!!!!  
Theoretically, cohesiveness allows the assessment of the magnitude of a 
coalition’s unity. It measures the extent to which different parties composing a 
Thesis  Toni Joe Lebbos 
 
 
 
 
23 
coalition are concentrated around the ideological mean of the coalition 
(Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014). 
C) SOCIOCULTURAL MOOD 
 I also control for country social mood and cultural mood, and use data by 
Baumgartner et al (2014). Socionomics postulates that social and cultural mood 
somewhat foresees social events such as the outcomes of elections (Prechter, Goel, 
& Parker, We know how you’ll vote next November: social mood, financial 
markets and presidential election outcomes., 2007). In other words, social mood 
trends significantly define aspects of both elections and trends in a country’s 
stock market. Prechter and Robert (1999) argues that voters involuntarily (and 
erroneously) recognize and credit incumbents for their positive moods and blame 
incumbents for their negative moods. It is imperative to distinguish between 
endogenous mood and emotional reactions to exogenous stimuli. Mood, as defined 
in socionomics, is an endogenous, global activation state with no specific external 
referent. Emotions on the other hand are sentimental reactions to specific stimuli 
(Wright, Sloman, & Beaudoin, 1996). Sociocultural mood levels are measured via 
national surveys regarding quality of life, opinions on social matters and political 
affairs, hapiness indicators and affect valuation index (Parker, 2007). Data in 
such alterations in social and cultural mood in a country helps capture changes in 
volatility due to fluctuations in the overarching atmospheres governing France. It 
is expected that sociocultural moods will have a positive effect on stock market 
volatility. 
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4 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
To empirically test whether the status of the French government does 
ultimately affect stock market volatility, that later variable will be regressed 
using a standard OLS approach on the principal explanatory variables that are 
Divided Legislative and Divided Executive. Each “Divided” dummy equals 1 if 
the political power within that section of the government belongs to the same 
party, 0 otherwise. In other words, the variable dvdlegislative equals 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided (0 otherwise) and the variable 
dvdexecutive equal 1 if the executive branch of the government is divided (0 
otherwise). Several control variables will be added to account for inflation, GDP 
per Capita, pre-1987, pre-electoral uncertainty, cohesiveness, distance and 
sociocultural mood of the country during the periods considered. Inflation and 
GDPpc were accounted for in similar studies such as Bechtel & Füss (2008). It is 
important to note that unlike Bechtel & Füss (2008), I do not account for 
Interest Rates. This is because including interest rates as an independent variable 
decreases the explanatory power of the model (lower adjusted R-Squared) and 
raises issues of multicollinearity (refer to annex 14 for more details). Pre-electoral 
uncertainty, cohesiveness, distance and sociocultural mood were also accounted 
for as well in a similar study by Baumgartner et al (2014). 
 In the first model, the two main variables dvdlegislative and dvdexecutive 
are analyzed separately to assess the impact of each on stock market returns. The 
first model is presented below:   
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𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽! 𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝛽!  𝑃𝑟𝑒1987 + 𝛽! 𝑙𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽!  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝛽! 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 +  𝛽! 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽!  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽! 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽!"  𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 
In the second model, the two main variables dvdlegislative and 
dvdexecutive are analyzed as interactive terms, mainly to tease out the effects of 
having both branched of the government being simultaneously divided, i.e. 
divided legislative and divided executive. Model 2 is as follows:  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽! (𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒×𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) +  𝛽!  𝑃𝑟𝑒1987 + 𝛽! 𝑙𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽!  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+ 𝛽! 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 +  𝛽! 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽!  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽! 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑+ 𝛽!  𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 
 
In short, the empirical estimation process, through the two models presented, 
aims at answering the following questions:  
1. Do patterns of government control have an effect on stock market 
volatility? 
2. Does volatility decrease in times of divided government as suggested by 
the gridlock hypothesis? 
5 RESULTS  
 Results for the first model are displayed in Table 5 below. Firstly, Looking 
at the model’s F-statistic and the p-value of the F-statistic, one can see that it is 
globally significant. Estimates for both our key explanatory variable 
dvdlegislative and dvdexecutive are statistically significant and indicate that 
having a divided legislative branch leads to an increase of around 5% in French 
stock market volatility and that having a divided executive branch leads to an 
(1) 
(2) 
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increase of around 4% in French stock market volatility. The overall models seem 
to be a good fit for the analysis at hand with an R-squared value of 0.620.  
TABLE 6: MODEL 1 RESULTS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
dvdexecutive 0.0401** 
 (0.0185) 
dvdlegislature 0.0513*** 
 (0.0176) 
legelect 0.0306 
 (0.0211) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.159*** 
 (0.0345) 
inflation 0.0105*** 
 (0.00313) 
gdppc -2.60e-06 
 (3.74e-06) 
cohesiveness 0.00229 
 (0.00229) 
distance 0.00201** 
 (0.000761) 
sociomood 0.000964 
 (0.00166) 
culturemood 0.00693*** 
 (0.00231) 
Constant -0.285** 
 (0.113) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE    
F(10,    37) 
Prob > F 
0.620 
0.51668648 
.04351 
10.60 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
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legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for 
years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in 
which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation 
controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc controls for fluctuation in GDP per 
capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the 
ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for 
endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics and analysis results of our 
second model. The main additional insight this model provides can be seen by 
looking at the effects of having both a legislative and executive divided branches 
on stock market volatility. Looking at the model’s F-statistic and the p-value of 
the F-statistic, one can see that it is globally significant. Outcomes show that 
having such a pattern of government control increases stock market volatility by 
an average of 10%. The second model seems to be an even better fit for the 
analysis at hand with an R-squared value of 0.641. 
TABLE 7: MODEL 2 RESULTS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
0b.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0 
 (0) 
0b.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0209 
 (0.0246) 
1.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0.0291 
 (0.0199) 
1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.103*** 
 (0.0213) 
legelect 0.0305 
 (0.0203) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.151*** 
 (0.0334) 
inflation 0.00968*** 
 (0.00312) 
gdppc -3.29e-06 
 (3.53e-06) 
Thesis  Toni Joe Lebbos 
 
 
 
 
28 
cohesiveness -0.000303 
 (0.00283) 
distance 0.00177** 
 (0.000740) 
sociomood 0.000173 
 (0.00171) 
culturemood 0.00621** 
 (0.00237) 
Constant -0.155 
 (0.119) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE  
F(11, 36) =   15.01 
Prob > F 
0.641 
0. 53186864 
.04282 
15.01 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislatur refers to 
situations in which both the legislative and the executive branches of the government are divided. Lgelect is 
a lag dummy variable accounting for years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable 
controlling for years before 1987 in which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our 
computation of volatility. Inflation controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc 
controls for fluctuation in GDP per capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the 
majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and 
Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might 
have an effect on volatility. 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
 Results obtained form this study are quite interesting in that they 
contradict a similar study performed by Bechtel & Fuss (2008) on the German 
stock market. In fact, whereas their study confirms the gridlock hypothesis of 
divided government decreasing stock market volatility through assuaging policy 
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risk, our study shows that political environments in France characterized by a 
divided government actually increase stock market volatility.  
One way of explaining our results relates to investor expectations and the 
effect such expectations have on stock market prices. Stock market returns are 
more volatile in times of uncertainty. The gridlock hypothesis argues that such 
uncertainty is abated when a government is divided because policies shaping 
business environments are harder to approve and implement. However, one could 
also argue that in times of unified government, expectations of what policies 
would be implemented are easier to determine thus decreasing investor 
uncertainty and therefore also decreasing volatility. This also makes sense in 
France since the political system is designed in manner that avoids legislative 
paralysis (Conley, 2007). In other words, since laws will be crafted and 
implemented at nearly the same rate in both divided and unified states of the 
government (Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014), 
situations where the government is unified might be better (less uncertain) for 
investors since they are more likely to predict what type of policies will be 
instigated. It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 the	difference	between	my	 results	 and	 the	results	 obtained	 by	 Bechtel & Fuss (2008) might be due to different political 
system structures. Gridlock in the German political system is more probable than 
in the French political system.  	
Our results are also in line with Mayhew’s Divided We Govern theory 
(Mayhew, 1991) where he specifies that having a divided government does not 
necessarily lead to a lesser amount of shifts in the political landscape. We 
however extend this analysis to France and contribute further by looking at the 
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different impacts legislative and executive branches of the government have on 
stock market returns.		
7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I subject both models to a series of robustness checks to verify results. 
Robustness checks include testing for omitted variable bias, testing for 
autocorrelation, testing for multicollinearity between explanatory variables, and 
omitting abnormal observation from sample.  
6.1 TESTING FOR OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS  
I test both models for omitted variables using the Ramsey Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test and find that neither model suffers from such a 
bias.  Results of Both tests are shown below:  
 
 
6.2 TESTING FOR AUTOCORRELATION  
 To start with, I test for autocorrelation using the standard Durbin Watson 
d-statistic on each model and obtain a value of 1.76147 for the first and 1.896004 
for the second. Given that the critical values for the first model are 0.97060 and 
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1.81540, and that of second model are 0.88334 and 1.94210, the test is 
inconclusive since dL< d < dU in both cases. For this reason I conduct further 
tests.  
 Firstly, by plotting residuals of both models on a line graph, one can see 
that there are no trends obvious trends:  
FIGURE 6: LINE GRAPH R1 
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FIGURE 7: LINE GRAPH R2 
 
This indicates that, to the naked eye, residuals seem to be merely white noise. 
Testing further for autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation, I use 
Stata’s corrgram command and find no significant autocorrelation in both 
models: 
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FIGURE 8: AUTOCORRELATION OF R1 
 
FIGURE 9: AUTOCORRELATION OF R2 
 
 I also perform Bartlett’s periodogram-based test for white noise and 
obtain the following figures:  
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FIGURE 10: CUMULATIVE PERIODOGRAM WHITE-NOISE TEST R1 
 
FIGURE 11CUMULATIVE PERIODOGRAM WHITE-NOISE TEST R2 
 
Both figures indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis stating 
there is no autocorrelation. This means that the residuals in both models are 
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random and that autocorrelation is not present. This is confirmed when running 
a Portmanteau (Q) test for white noise that yield the following statistics and 
further proves the absence of autocorrelation.   
 
6.3 TESTING FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
I test for multicollinearity using Variance Inflation Factors (vif). Those 
latters test the magnitude to which the variance of estimated coefficients is 
inflated because of multicollinearity. Results for both models show that GDP per 
capita might be biasing estimates.  
Consequently, I run both regressions again while omitting GDPpc and 
obtain the following results:  
TABLE 8: MODEL 1 ADJUSTED FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
dvdexecutive 0.0390** 
 (0.0170) 
dvdlegislature 0.0511*** 
 (0.0151) 
legelect 0.0341* 
 (0.0180) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.149*** 
 (0.0360) 
inflation 0.0105*** 
 (0.00342) 
cohesiveness 0.00228 
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 (0.00220) 
distance 0.00243*** 
 (0.000537) 
sociomood 0.000837 
 (0.00156) 
culturemood 0.00583*** 
 (0.00174) 
Constant -0.312*** 
 (0.0917) 
  
Observations 49 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE    
F (9, 39)    
Prob > F 
0.620 
0.53237098 
.04261 
12.88 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for 
years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in 
which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation 
controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance 
within the majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. 
Sociomood and Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation states with no specific external 
referent that might have an effect on volatility.  
 
 
TABLE 9: MODEL 2 ADJUSTED FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
0b.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0 
 (0) 
0b.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0313 
 (0.0203) 
1.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0.0274 
 (0.0202) 
1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.101*** 
 (0.0195) 
legelect 0.0335* 
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 (0.0174) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.140*** 
 (0.0349) 
inflation 0.00970*** 
 (0.00347) 
cohesiveness 0.000699 
 (0.00252) 
distance 0.00231*** 
 (0.000522) 
sociomood 0.000479 
 (0.00158) 
culturemood 0.00513*** 
 (0.00178) 
Constant -0.237** 
 (0.101) 
  
Observations 49 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE     
F(10, 38)  
Prob > F 
0.636 
0.54084013 
.04222 
17.48 
0.0000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislatur refers to 
situations in which both the legislative and the executive branches of the government are divided. Lgelect is 
a lag dummy variable accounting for years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable 
controlling for years before 1987 in which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our 
computation of volatility. Inflation controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values. Cohesiveness is a 
measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between 
the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation 
states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
 
Both modified models have relatively similar results to their corresponding 
previous initial models and estimates related to the main explanatory variables 
are actually more statistically significant. In the adjusted model, having a divided 
legislative branch seems to contribute to a 4.75% increase in stock market 
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volatility and having a divided executive branch seems to contribute to a 3.69% 
increase in volatility. If both legislative and executive branches were divided, 
model 2 suggests this would lead to a 9.56% increase in volatility.  
6.4 EXCLUDING ABNORMAL OBSERVATION FROM SAMPLE 
I rerun both initial models while excluding observations with abnormal 
volatility values that coincide with times of financial crisis. The observations 
removed are that of 2002 corresponding to the crash of the dot.com bubble and 
that of 2008 corresponding to the global financial crises.  
 
TABLE 10: MODEL 1 ADJUSTED FOR ABNORMAL ABSERVATIONS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
dvdexecutive 0.0435** 
 (0.0174) 
dvdlegislature 0.0510*** 
 (0.0158) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.149*** 
 (0.0306) 
legelect 0.0131 
 (0.0136) 
inflation 0.00886*** 
 (0.00261) 
gdppc -5.30e-06** 
 (2.54e-06) 
cohesiveness 0.00170 
 (0.00226) 
distance 0.00129** 
 (0.000626) 
sociomood 0.00164 
 (0.00137) 
culturemood 0.00694*** 
 (0.00210) 
Constant -0.214* 
 (0.113) 
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Observations 46 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE     
F( 10,    35)  
Prob > F 
0.618 
0. 50920054 
.03665 
8.57 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for 
years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in 
which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation 
controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc controls for fluctuation in GDP per 
capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the 
ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for 
endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
 
TABLE 11: MODEL 2 ADJUSTED FOR ABNORMAL OBSERVATIONS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
0b.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0 
 (0) 
0b.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0291 
 (0.0211) 
1.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0.0363* 
 (0.0182) 
1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.107*** 
 (0.0216) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.144*** 
 (0.0304) 
legelect 0.0135 
 (0.0129) 
inflation 0.00845*** 
 (0.00271) 
gdppc -5.65e-06** 
 (2.46e-06) 
cohesiveness -0.000283 
 (0.00273) 
distance 0.00122* 
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 (0.000637) 
sociomood 0.00106 
 (0.00138) 
culturemood 0.00647*** 
 (0.00216) 
Constant -0.131 
 (0.116) 
  
Observations 46 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE   
F(11,    34)  
Prob > F  
0.637 
0.52002274 
.03624 
10.03 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislatur refers to 
situations in which both the legislative and the executive branches of the government are divided. Lgelect is 
a lag dummy variable accounting for years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable 
controlling for years before 1987 in which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our 
computation of volatility. Inflation controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc 
controls for fluctuation in GDP per capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the 
majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and 
Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might 
have an effect on volatility. 
 
 By excluding two abnormal observations from both models, results 
obtained remain significant in the same direction in that states of divided 
government lead to an increase in stock market volatility.  
ACCOUNTING FOR CRISIS YEARS USING DUMMY VARIABLES 
 To further assess the impact of crisis years on our estimation process, I 
run both main models again while adding a dummy variable (crisis) to account 
for years characterized by abnormal volatility values due to events such as a 
financial market crisis.  
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Results for Model 1 are consistent with the previous analysis in that a 
divided legislative branch and a divided executive branch are seen to separately 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on stock market volatility. 
Having a divided legislative branch increases stock market volatility by an 
average of 4.06% and having a divided legislative branch increases volatility by 
an average of 3.43%. Below is the output of the regression mentioned:  
TABLE 12: MODEL 1 WITH ACCOUNTING FOR CRISIS YEARS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
dvdexecutive 0.0343* 
 (0.0171) 
dvdlegislature 0.0406** 
 (0.0163) 
crisis 0.112*** 
 (0.0342) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.144*** 
 (0.0341) 
legelect 0.0170 
 (0.0134) 
inflation 0.00837*** 
 (0.00271) 
gdppc -5.41e-06* 
 (2.70e-06) 
cohesiveness 0.00166 
 (0.00244) 
distance 0.000864 
 (0.000648) 
sociomood 0.00114 
 (0.00139) 
culturemood 0.00636*** 
 (0.00213) 
Constant -0.133 
 (0.104) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 0.722 
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Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE     
F( 11,    36)    
Prob > F 
0. 63686846 
.03772 
10.35 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes on the 
values 1 in years characterized by a financial crisis. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for years 
characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in which 
we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation 
controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc controls for fluctuation in GDP per 
capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the 
ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for 
endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
The second model is consistent as well with previous results. Even when 
accounting for crisis years. It indicates that having a divided legislative branch 
and a divided executive branch simultaneously contributes to an increase in stock 
market volatility by 8.31%. 
TABLE 13: MODEL 2 WITH ACCOUNTING FOR CRISIS 
 (1) 
VARIABLES annualized_standard_deviation_re 
  
0b.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0 
 (0) 
0b.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0223 
 (0.0217) 
1.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0.0278 
 (0.0186) 
1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0831*** 
 (0.0215) 
crisis 0.106*** 
 (0.0372) 
dummy_pre1987 -0.140*** 
 (0.0340) 
legelect 0.0177 
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 (0.0129) 
inflation 0.00800*** 
 (0.00283) 
gdppc -5.69e-06** 
 (2.64e-06) 
cohesiveness 8.47e-05 
 (0.00282) 
distance 0.000778 
 (0.000683) 
sociomood 0.000641 
 (0.00141) 
culturemood 0.00594** 
 (0.00226) 
Constant -0.0606 
 (0.114) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root MSE  
F (12,    35) 
Prob > F 
0.730 
0. 63749378 
.03769 
9.62 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the 20-days moving standard deviation of CAC 
40/financial market indicator returns (unconditional volatility). Estimates are OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the 
government is divided, 0 otherwise. Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
legislative branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislatur refers to 
situations in which both the legislative and the executive branches of the government are divided. Crisis is a 
dummy variables that takes on the value 1 in years characterized by a financial crisis. Lgelect is a lag 
dummy variable accounting for years characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable 
controlling for years before 1987 in which we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our 
computation of volatility. Inflation controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc 
controls for fluctuation in GDP per capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the 
majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and 
Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might 
have an effect on volatility. 
ANALYSIS USING DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF VOLATILITY 
 As a final step to confirm results obtained, I run the same analysis using a 
different method of estimating stock market volatility (referred to as from now as 
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Method 2). In this method, I compute stock market volatility by simply taking 
the standard deviation of returns throughout each year.  
 Results are consistent with our previous findings in that divided 
government is seen to have a positive and statistically significant impact on stock 
market volatility. Model 1 indicates that, empirically, having a divided legislative 
branch of the government contributes to an increase in volatility by 1.12%. The 
table below represents the output of the regression mentioned:  
TABLE 14: MODEL 1 USING METHOD 2 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Volatility 
  
dvdexecutive 0.00131 
 (0.00311) 
dvdlegislature 0.0112** 
 (0.00461) 
legelect 0.00865* 
 (0.00469) 
pre1987 -0.0160 
 (0.0132) 
inflation 0.00312** 
 (0.00119) 
gdppc -1.35e-06 
 (1.22e-06) 
cohesiveness 0.00153* 
 (0.000825) 
distance 0.000307 
 (0.000227) 
sociomood 0.000503 
 (0.000468) 
culturemood 0.00107 
 (0.000726) 
Constant -0.0558* 
 (0.0279) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 0.680 
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Adjusted R-Squared 
Root-MSE 
F (10, 37) 
Prob > F  
0. 59393498 
.01045 
11.52 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the standard deviation of CAC 40/financial market 
indicator returns. Estimates are OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 
Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the legislative branch of the government is 
divided, 0 otherwise. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for years characterized by elections. 
Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in which we use the financial market 
indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation controls for fluctuations in 
consumer price index values and GDPpc controls for fluctuation in GDP per capita. Cohesiveness is a 
measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the ideological distance between 
the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for endogenous, global activation 
states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
 
Model 2 indicates that having simultaneously a divided executive branch 
and a divided legislative branch contributes to an increase in volatility by around 
1.04%. The table below represents the output of the regression:  
TABLE 15: MODEL 2 USING METHOD 2 
VARIABLES Volatility 
  
0b.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0 
 (0) 
0b.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0163 
 (0.0102) 
1.dvdexecutive#0b.dvdlegislature 0.00319 
 (0.00408) 
1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislature 0.0104*** 
 (0.00270) 
legelect 0.00856* 
 (0.00461) 
pre1987 -0.0158 
 (0.0128) 
inflation 0.00316** 
 (0.00120) 
gdppc -1.17e-06 
 (1.21e-06) 
cohesiveness 0.00195 
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 (0.00122) 
distance 0.000338 
 (0.000239) 
sociomood 0.000651 
 (0.000527) 
culturemood 0.00115 
 (0.000784) 
Constant -0.0781 
 (0.0476) 
  
Observations 48 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Root-MSE 
F (11, 36) 
Prob > F 
0.690 
0.59519688 
.01044 
9.64 
0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is volatility measured as the standard deviation of CAC 40/financial market 
indicator returns. Estimates are OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Dvdexecutive is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the executive branch of the government is divided, 0 otherwise. 
Dvdlegislature is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the legislative branch of the government is 
divided, 0 otherwise. 1.dvdexecutive#1.dvdlegislatur refers to situations in which both the legislative and 
the executive branches of the government are divided. Lgelect is a lag dummy variable accounting for years 
characterized by elections. Dummy_pre1987 is a dummy variable controlling for years before 1987 in which 
we use the financial market indicator instead of the CAC 40 in our computation of volatility. Inflation 
controls for fluctuations in consumer price index values and GDPpc controls for fluctuation in GDP per 
capita. Cohesiveness is a measure of the ideological distance within the majority. Distance refers to the 
ideological distance between the majority and the opposition. Sociomood and Culturemood control for 
endogenous, global activation states with no specific external referent that might have an effect on volatility. 
 
Since results in our first estimation (Method 1) also indicate a positive 
relationship between divided states of the government and stock market 
volatility, outcomes from this robustness check are coherent and confirm our 
previous analysis.  
8 LIMITATIONS  
 The analysis conducted could be improved in various manners. A first step 
for improvement would be to increase sample size either by considering a larger 
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time span or by dissecting further the yearly data provided (gathering quarterly 
data instead of yearly for instance). Also, different ways of defining divided vs. 
unified could be tested out to examine further the impact of different parts of the 
government of stock market volatility. Another suggestion would be to add more 
countries to the analysis; this however raises the question of whether results are 
truly comparable given the different political systems used. Another limitation is 
the use of two different indicators as a proxy for the performance of the French 
stock market. A smoother analysis is expected for countries that have used the 
same performance indicator for the entirety of the analysis.  
9 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper tackles an interesting conundrum that has yet to 
see more empirical proof throughout the world. The literature review conducted 
provides a rigorous base of intuition and insight regarding the existing literature. 
Two main conflicting notions are tackled: the notion of a gridlock effect that is 
expected to decrease stock market volatility by assuaging policy risk and the 
notion that government structure and patterns of control have no significant 
impact on stock market volatility. Findings of this study reject the gridlock 
hypothesis and argue that having a divided government (divided legislative and 
divided executive branches) contributes to an increase in stock market volatility. 
This fits well with Conley (2007)’s claim that major shifts in the political 
landscape have happened in periods of divided government and giving intuitive 
sense to the rise in stock market volatility during those periods. These finding 
carry implications for further research in political economics and financial 
markets. Also, an increase in stock market volatility often leads to the 
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deterioration of capital investment by risk-averse investors. Considering such 
effects, an important implication of our result is states of divided governments 
might be a key explanatory variable in determining inflow levels of capital stock. 
Further research could, in addition to expanding sample size, look more into the 
different companies composing the CAC 40 companies and their political 
proximity to the government. Assessing the variation of their stock prices given 
different states of the government could yield interesting results.  
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ANNEXES  
ANNEX 1: MODEL 1 & 2 OUTPUT EXCLUDING MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
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ANNEX 2: MODEL 1 OUTPUT  
 
ANNEX 3: MODEL 2 OUTPUT  
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ANNEX 3: STANDARD DURBIN WATSON D-STATISTIC MODEL 1 & 2 
 
 
ANNEX 4: CORRGRAM OUTPUT MODEL 1 & 2  
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ANNEX 5: MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST 
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ANNEX 6: OUTPUT MODEL 1 ADJUSTED FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY  
 
ANNEX 7: OUTPUT MODEL 2 ADJUSTED FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY  
 
Thesis  Toni Joe Lebbos 
 
 
 
 
57 
ANNEX 8: OUTPUT MODEL 1 WITH OMISSION OF ABNORMAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
ANNEX 9: OUTPUT MODEL 2 WITH OMISSION OF ABNORMAL OBSERVATIONS 
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ANNEX 10: OUTPUT MODEL 1 WITH ACCOUNTING FOR CRISIS YEARS 
 
ANNEX 11: OUTPUT MODEL 2 WITH ACCOUNTING FOR CRISIS YEARS 
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ANNEX 12: OUTPUT MODEL 1 USING METHOD 2 
 
ANNEX 13: OUTPUT MODEL 2 USING METHOD 2 
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ANNEX 14: MODELS 1 & 2 WITH INTEREST INCLUDED AS EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLE  
 
 
